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THE DEMISE OF RACE DISTINCTIONS IN
GRADUATE EDUCATION
ROBERT C. TAYLOR*
A recent group of cases has propelled the issue of Negro
segregation in education toward a final phase of an his-
toric struggle. For years, colored leaders and liberal white
educators had futilely assailed the wall of race distinctions
behind which the southern white school system had existed.
The present attitude of the United States Supreme Court,
however, has opened a breach in the barrier, for it appears
that race distinctions in graduate and professional educa-
tion, if not completely removed, are at least disappearing
rapidly.
This article attempts to trace the metamorphosis of a
standard of equality, a judicial measuring rod, by which
the segregation of the Negro has in the past been measured
and sustained. The most recent cases and sociological sur-
veys indicate that it is questionable whether segregation,
at least in the higher levels of education, can continue to
exist. Finally, the possible extension of this standard of
equality to the advanced schools of private institutions is
investigated, for the problem of racial discrimination in
universities not directly supported by the state may indeed
become an important one. Any accurate prognosis is im-
possible, but analysis indicates that the next decision of
the Supreme Court may well afford a final answer to the
question whether segregation in graduate education is per-
missible under a Constitution which commands that no
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal
protection of the laws.1
L A Search for Substantial Equality
Within a short period after the Civil War, legislation
establishing separate schools for white and colored was
* 2nd year law, Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1949.
U.S. CoNSTrrUTION, Amd. XIV, sec. 1. See Frank, The Original Un-
derstanding of "Equal Protection o1 the Laws," 50 COL. L. REv. 131
(1950).
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contested on constitutional grounds. 2 Post Civil War philos-
ophy in regard to educational segregation found expression
in United States v. Buntin, where a United States Circuit
Court held that so long as educational advantages for
Negroes were in all respects "substantially equal" to those
provided for white, no' denial of equal protection resulted.3
When this issue was finally presented to the Supreme Court,
the rule of the Buntin case was upheld.4 The court relied
upon Plessy v. Ferguson,5 now recognized as the classic case
upholding the power of a state legislature to separate the
white and colored races.
Having committed themselves to a standard of "substan-
tial equality," the courts became faced with the difficulty
of interpreting it. Some courts reluctantly conceded that
"substantial equality" permitted many inequalities. As
late as 1937 a court brushed aside a charge of unconstitu-
tional discrimination against colored children who, having
taken and passed high school admittance examinations,
were denied admission because of race and color. Similar
suits to remove inequities had been none too successful,7
"NELsoN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 1920,
p. 112 (1946), indicates that Amd. XIV and Art IV, sec. 2 were Invoked.
The equal protection clause has become, however, the almost universal
ground upon which educational segregation issues have been fought out.
3 10 Fed. 730 (Cir. Ct. Ohio, 1882). Many later cases have been In-
terpreted as laying down a rule that a state may furnish "separate but
equal" educational facilities for Negroes. The two expressions are
synonymous.
Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528
(1899). See also Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), where the
Supreme Court again affirmed the Buntin rule.
' 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The court emphasized that segregation was
not a white judgment of colored inferiority nor was It discriminatory
to restrict Negroes to colored sections. 34 MiNN. L. REV. 289 (1950)
reprints a brief of the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segrega-
tion in Legal Education attacking basic doctrine of the Plessy case;
Cf. Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 629 (1949).
8 Williams v. Zimmerman, 172 Md. 152, 192 Atl. 353 (1937): "Possi-
bly there might be, under some circumstances, Inequalities encountered
In dealing with the two races separately that would render the main-
tenance of the separation inconsistent with the constitutional require-
ment of equal protection of the laws, but the allowance of separate treat.
ment at all involves allowance of some incidental differences."
7 NE.soN, supra., note 2 at 112 et seq.
THE DEMISE OF RACE DISTINCTIONS
and continued to fail until complaints concentrating upon
segregation in the top echelons of education were brought
to the courts.
H. The Change to Equality in Fact
Prior to 1935, court action invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment in questions of educational opportunities for
Negroes placed little or no emphasis upon provisions for
collegiate, graduate and professional studies.8 In 1935,
however, a young Negro resident of Baltimore sued for
writ of mandamus to compel authorities of the University
of Maryland to admit him to the law school. In holding that
the petitioner was entitled to admission, 9 the state court
looked at the Maryland out-of-state scholarship act10 and
decided that such scholarships did not give substantially
equal educational opportunities to the Negro students re-
ceiving them. It was then but a step for the United States
Supreme Court to reach the same result despite a declara-
tion of intent by the affected state to establish an equal law
school for Negroes." The Gaines decision, therefore, em-
8 Ibid. For a contention that by 1930 Negro students were graduat-
ing from American colleges in sufficient numbers to spotlight the gen-
eral absence of such facilities in southern states, see JOHNSON, THE
NEGRO COLLEGE GRADUATE (1938). In 1944 a nation wide survey dis-
closed that nine southern states made no provisions whatsoever for
graduate or professional training for Negroes despite the fact that such
was provided at public expense for white students. United States Office
of Education, National Survey of Higher Education for Negroes (1944).
0 Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936).
20 Such scholarship acts usually provided for the payment of tuition
fees for Negro students, who attended universities outside the state for
courses offered to white students at the state university from which
Negroes were excluded by law.
11 Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 346 (1938): "... it
appears that the policy of establishing a law school at Lincoln Univer-
sity has not yet ripened into an actual establishment, and it cannot be
said that a mere declaration of purpose, still unfulfilled, is enough."
Mo. Rev. Stat., 9622 provides in part: 1... Whenever the board of
curators deem it advisable they shall have the power to open any
necessary school or department." This clause was enacted pursuant
to the establishment of the Missouri out-of-state scholarship fund under
this section. The Gaines case expressly invalidated such enactments
and cited with approval the Murray case, supra., note 9.
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phasized that "substantial equality," at least on the grad-
uate and professional level, would require the actual main-
tenance of separate graduate schools established for the
sole use of interested and qualified Negro students.
Some states attempted to solve the problem presented by
the Gaines decision through measures to provide graduate
instruction within the state for colored scholars.12 But
such efforts created new woes. While it was once con-
tended that the cost of duplicate facilities might be offset
by the alleged fact that Negroes require less than whites
or more willingly do without, such a conclusion was belied
by statistics indicating higher per capita expenditures for
Negro than for white students.13 Skyrocketing educational
I The North Carolina Commission to Study Public Schools and Col-
leges for Colored People recommended that "some satisfactory plan for
providing graduate and professional education in the state shall be
determined by the Legislature of 1939." Commission Report and Rec-
ommendations, pp. 57-61. Accordingly, in the same year a graduate
school and law school were established at the North Carolina College
for Negroes.
In 1935, Texas supported thirteen colleges for Negroes, six of which
were standard senior colleges. Texas Dept. of Ed. Bulletin, Negro Edu-
cation in Texas, XI, p. 3 (1935). Yet the Texas legislature of 1947
passed an act providing for the establishment of "The Texas State
University for Negroes" to be located at Houston. Act of 1947, S.B.
140, Ch. 29, Acts. 50th Leg., VEaNoN's Civ. STAT. ANN., Art. 2643b. It
appears that the Act of 1947 represented an attempt to evade an adverse
decision by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. See Sweatt v. Painter,
210 S.W. 2d 442 (1948), where petitioner, a Negro, was suing for ad-
mittance to the Texas University School of Law. He had applied for
admission in 1946; the state established the Negro law school in 1947.
See Wheildon, Editorial Research Reports, XI, p. 824 (1947) for a
discussion of the Missouri law school for Negroes.
2 Wheildon, op cit., note 12. In Missouri the per capita tax cost for
students at the separate Negro law school was $695 during the bien-
nium 1939-40; the comparable cost for white students at the University
of Missouri was only $229 per capita.
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budgets in an inflationary period 14 plus small enrollment 15
and consequently small total revenues from tuition and
fees raised the price of prejudice. Then, after a brief lull,
the Supreme Court announced its momentous decision 6 in
Sweatt v. Painter7 and dragged the skeleton of "substan-
tial equality" from the judicial closet in order to read the
last rites:
"In accordance with these cases, petitioner may
claim his full constitutional right; legal education
equivalent to that offered by the State to students
of other races. Such education is not available to
him in a separate law school as offered by the
State."' 8
Comparing the physical facilities of the University of Texas
Law School with those of the law school for Negroes, the
Chief Justice emphatically stated that:
21 To establish the Texas State University for Negroes the legisla-
ture appropriated $2,000,000 for land, buildings and equipment and
$500,000 per annum for maintenance for the biennium ending August
31, 1949. Acts 50th Leg., § 2, supra., note 12. In 1950 North Carolina
appropriated $10,000,000 for a building program within its colored
university system. See opinion of Hayes, J. in Durham Morning Herald,
p. 1 (Oct. 10, 1950). In an appeal to the United State Supreme Court,
Louisiana contended that in 1950 it had appropriated $2,500 for each
Negro student at Southern Negro University. See New York Times,
p. 1, col. 1 (Jan. 2, 1951). In New York Times, Sec. IV, p. 9 (Apr. 27,
1941) it Is mentioned that estimates of the cost necessary to establish
educational equality as between Negroes and whites in the South had
ranged from an additional $400,000 per year to a total of $56,000,000.
11 Missouri has maintained an all-Negro law school at Lincoln con-
tinuously since 1939, in compliance with the Supreme Court ruling in
the Gaines case, despite the fact that the peak attendance has been 35
students and in one year (1943) no students were enrolled. Wheildon,
op cit., note 12. The University of Texas maintains a separate law
school for Negroes which had a total enrollment of only 23 students
in 1950. See Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W. 2d 442, 444 (1948). North
Carolina established a law school at the North Carolina College for
Negroes in 1939. By 1950 there were 28 students regularly attending
classes. See opinion of Hayes, J. supra., note 14.
" That the ultimate decision was of importance to most of the
southern states is evidenced by the fact that briefs in support of re-
spondents were filed Amidi Curiae on behalf of Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
I1 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
I8 Id., at 635.
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"Whether the University of Texas Law School is
compared with the original or the new law school
for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality
in the educational opportunities offered white and
Negro law students by the state."' 9
Not content with a disapproval of physical inequalities, the
Chief Justice stressed the significance of certain subjective
attributes like reputation of the faculty, experience of the
administration, position and influence of alumni and stand-
ing in the community. 20 In the unanimous opinion of the
court the University of Texas Law School possessed to "a
far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a
law school." 21
Had the court definitely discarded "substantial equality"
in favor of the new standard, "equality in fact?" As if to
dispel any uncertainty which might have clouded the Sweatt
decision, the court on the same day decided McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Board of Regents.22 A Negro citizen of
Oklahoma, possessing a master's degree, had been admitted
to the graduate school of the University of Oklahoma. In
compliance with state law he had been assigned, however,
to a special seat in the classroom, and to special tables in
the cafeteria and library. Such action, said the court, is
not equality of treatment because:
"[These restrictions] signify that the State, in ad-
ministering the facilities it affords for professional
and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the
other students . . . Such restrictions impair and
inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and in
general to learn his profession. ' 23
Unquestionably, "equality in fact" necessitated a new edu-
cational propinquity. Nor was the enunciation of the "fact"
standard a completely novel step, for lower Federal courts
19 Id. at 633.
20 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
22 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
= Id. at 641.
THE DEMISE OF RACE DISTINCTIONS
had previously followed a similar line of reasoning when
finding discrimination in public swimming poo 2 4 and golf
course2 .5 cases. The Sweatt and McLaurin decisions, there-
fore, were closely examined by the federal courts, and a not
surprising conclusion was quickly and succinctly drawn:
".... equality of the races means equality in fact
and not in theory.
'26
What had been before a general trend toward equality in
fact wherever tax-provided institutions existed under a
system of segregation had now become a rule of law.
M. The Incompatibility of Equality in Fact
and Segregation
The current issue to be judicially determined is whether
a state can meet the equality in fact test and still insist
upon segregation in the upper levels of education. Few
printed opinions exist to guide those who would survey
the cases; moreover, it is questionable that another decision
would create more than a ripple in already troubled waters.
It has been pointed out, however, that the doctrine of the
Plessy case has never been expressly overruled, 27 and, al-
though agitation for such a holding has increased since the
2, Lopez v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Calif. 1944). City offi-
cials had excluded citizens of Mexican and Latin descent from use of
public bath house and swimming pool.
- Law v. Mayor of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1948). An
order of the Baltimore Recreation Board permitting Negro golfers to
play only on a municipal course reserved exclusively for Negroes con-
stituted a denial of equal protection contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. For another golf course case see Rice v. Arnold, 71 Sup. Ct. 77
(1950); 35 MwN. L. REv. 399 (1951).
" Draper v. City of St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D. Mo. 1950).
"'What are substantially equal facilities? In the Gaines case it referred
to a legal education. The Gaines case did not define the terms by a
discussion of particular physical facilities because the questions pre-
sented did not call for it.. . . As we read the McLaurin case the mean-
ing of 'substantial' has been narrowed to a very fine line. Regulations
that have for their purpose and do separate the races in use of tax-
provided public institutions can no longer be sustained if they produce
inequalities."
= See Frank, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1949-50, 18 Cnn. L.
REv. 1 (1950), and 34 MINr. L. REv. 289, supra., note 5.
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Sweatt and McLaurin decisions, 28 segregation remains legal-
ly unprohibited. In spite of these observations the attitude
of administrative and legislative bodies, the action of indi-
vidual universities and the sentiments of many professors
and students furnish evidence that the concept of equality
in fact is being viewed as a standard totally incompatible
with segregation in graduate and professional schools.
Judicial Analysis: The recent case of McKissack v. Car-
michael29 focusses upon whether the state of North Caro-
lina could' deny to Negro students admission to the state
university law school by maintaining a "first rate" segre-
gated law school for colored. 80 Since the North Carolina
Negro law school has enjoyed a successful existence for
twelve years, the situation is somewhat distinguishable
from that of the parvenu Texas law school involved in the
Sweatt case. Conflicting opinions by the district judge and
the three judge federal Court of Appeals exhibit opposite
approaches to the issue stated above.
District Judge Hayes3' compared in detail the physical
facilities and advantages of the two law schools. A careful
breakdown of the opinion discloses, however, a reluctance
to dwell at length upon the subjective qualities suggested
by Chief Justice Vinson in Sweatt v. Painter.32 For exam-
See 29 NEB. L. REV. 470 (1950).
In Durham Morning Herald, p. 9 (Oct. 10, 1950) the complete text
of the District Court opinion is reprinted.
* The North Carolina College for Negroes Law School was estab-
lished under Public Laws (1939), Chap. 65; N.C. G.S. § 116-100.
3 Judge Hayes has become a storm center for discrimination suits.
In his most recent ruling he found that Durham, N.C. city schools have
discriminated against Negro children; plaintiffs were held entitled to
an injunction to prevent discrimination on account of race and color.
The method of enforcing the injunction remains undecided. See Dur-
ham Sun, p. 5 (Jan. 29, 1951). In this case the basic legality of segre-
gation was not directly in issue.
32 Supra., note 18.
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ple, the libraries, 3 housing facilities34 and size of the North
Carolina Negro education budget 35 were discussed; but rep-
utation of the faculty,36 experience of the administration,3 7
position and influence of the alumni 3s and standing in the
community 39 were mentioned summarily. Although the
Sweatt decision had specifically referred to those latter
qualities, Judge Hayes in McKissack v. Carmichael limited
the equality in fact test to the objective criteria. Promi-
nent legal authorities4 ° disagreed as to the quality of the
Negro law school; the opinion insisted that the segregated
institutions met the equality in fact test.
3 The University of North Carolina law library contains approx-
imately 64,000 volumes, two-thirds of which are not available for use.
The Negro law school library contains 30,000 volumes and the opinion
considers it "first rate."
Louisiana State University, in attempting to point out the equality
between its law school and the separate one established for Negroes,
stressed the existence of an air-conditioned library at Negro law school.
The LSU law library had no air conditioning. An unimpressed three
judge Federal Court cooled off this contention and ordered LSU to
admit Negroes to its law school. See Southern Patriot, vol. 8, p. 9
(1950). The Supreme Court has upheld this decision. New York Times,
sec. 1, p. 18 (Jan. 2, 1951).
3 The opinion stated that housing was inadequate at both institu-
tions, but that when the Negro library building is converted into a law
building, then housing facilities at each institution will be "substan-
tially equal" for the number of students likely to attend the institutions.
1 Three paragraphs of the opinion are devoted to a discussion of
North Carolina progress in maintaining segregated schools. A $4,000,-
000 budget for improvements and an annual operating budget in excess
of $1,000,000 are specifically mentioned.
18 The Negro professors at the Negro law school are referred to only
as "well-qualified" law school graduates of colored law schools.
8 No mention is made of the administration except that it is headed
by a full time dean.
I" This criterion emphasized in the Sweatt case, was discussed in one
statement: "Its [the Negro law school's] applicants for admission to the
bar are as successful in proportion to their number as those from the
University of North Carolina or other law schools of the state."
=' Dismissed in one sentence.
10 The dean of the Harvard Law School, a professor from the Uni-
versity of Chicago, and a professor from Howard University testified as
to the inferiorities. A former dean of the Temple Law School, a former
North Carolina Superior Court judge, two Wake Forest College profes-
sors and a former North Carolina Supreme Court justice testified to
the equality of opportunities.
19 L.W. 2468 (1951), - F.2d -.
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
the decision of the district court was reversed.41 This re-
versal was immediately interpreted to "make it impossible
for any Southern State to bar otherwise qualified Negroes
from white law schools, whether separate schools are pro-
vided or not.42 It is undeniable that the strong language
of the Court of Appeals-stressing as it did such intangible
qualities as the character of the respective students, their
social contacts and influence in the profession-rejected
segregation in professional education. But the court's
method of reaching that result left the Plessy doctrine of
separate but equal facilities theoretically untouched. Nev-
ertheless, insofar as the standard of equality in fact is
concerned, segregation in professional education has been
dealt a death blow. The North Carolina Negro law school
is one of the most firmly established and highly regarded
of the separate graduate schools for colored students. If
it cannot meet the test, no other can! Tradition and pres-
tige acquired by white universities over periods of time are
evidently not attainable by segregated institutions.
Although a petition for certiorari will probably be filed,48
the Court of Appeals emphasized that the case is not dif-
ferent in principle from Sweatt v. Painter.4 4 Accordingly,
it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will feel that the case
deserves detailed consideration.
Subsidiary Problems: If an assumption is made that the
University of North Carolina will lose on appeal, there will
be subsidiary problems arising from the admission of color-
ed law students. For one thing, under the McLaurin ruling
Negro graduate students must be permitted to eat in the
42 See Durham Morning Herald, (March 28, 1951), for comment on
the opinion and reprint of important paragraphs.
13 Apparently the trustees of the University of North Carolina do not
wish to be overly intransigent. They have decided to open the doors of
every university graduate school to qualified colored applicants where
equal facilities are not provided by the state. See Durham Morning
Herald, op. cit., note 42. However, this move was not meant to apply
to the law school because the trustees still contend that equal facilities
are available there for Negroes.
" Durham Sun, p. 1 (March 27, 1951).
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white student dining hall. Since law students and under-
graduates receive meals in the same dining hall at the state
university-and apparently the general public may also
eat there-persons other than law students will be thrown
into unaccustomed contact with Negroes. Whether these
persons will accept such contacts as calmly as law students
might is doubtful.
If it is imperative for purposes of professional contact-
as expressed in the McLaurin case45-- that Negroes associate
with their fellow white students, can this intimate associa-
tion be restricted to eating and studying activities? Must
not the university make available to the Negro law student
the same dormitory facilities which house his white coun-
terpart? The question of equality in dormitories is not
the only housing problem. Presumably, married Negro
law students seeking apartments in a white college com-
munity will be confronted with discriminatory practices
which have drawn considerable comment in recent years.46
What effect will the entrance of Negroes have upon social
and fraternal organizations among law students at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina? If these groups are sponsored
by the school and in any way integrated with its educational
activities, would not they too be subject to the equality in
fact test? These questions, unanswerable at present, indi-
cate practical difficulties in administering the decree of
the Court of Appeals, and suggest sociological ramifications
extending beyond the boundaries of the law school and its
student body.
Of greater legal significance are the constitutional diffi-
culties the University of North Carolina may encounter if
it limits the admission of Negroes to "residents" of the
state.47 If a non-resident Negro is refused admittance to
the University of North Carolina law school, under what
S upra., note 22, p. 645.
See Current Legal Attacks on Racial Restrictive Covenants, 15
CH. L. REV. 193 (1947); Race Discrimination in Housing, 57 YALE L.J.
426 (1948); Vaughn, Restrictive Covenants Based on Race, 5 NAT. BAu J.
381 (1947).
" The University of North Carolina Board of Trustees has appar-
ently given some indication of adopting such a policy.
145
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constitutional provisions may he seek to force open the
university doors? Among the possibilities are: (1) the
privileges and immunities clause;4s (2) the privileges or
immunities clause in the Fourteenth Amendment ;49 (3) the
equal protection clause ;50 and (4) the due process provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 51
Under the privileges and immunities clause the citizens
of each state are entitled to the privileges and immunities
of the citizens of the several states.52 Can it be contended
that a Negro citizen of another state is privileged to enter
the University of North Carolina law school, if he is academ-
ically qualified, because citizens of North Carolina may
enter? In answer, it can be pointed out that the Supreme
Court does not invalidate reasonable distinctions between
residents and non-residents.53  Accordingly, the university
could easily contend that crowded living quarters and
classrooms justify denial of admission to non-residents.
Since a state may allow only residents to practice law5 4
and enter other professions, the possibility of basing a suit
on the privileges and immunities clause seems remote.
Equally unfeasible is the contention that the "privileges
or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could
aid the non-resident Negro plaintiff. That clause protects
8 Art. IV, § 2: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states."
"Art. XIV, § 1: ". . . No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States."
w Art. XIV, § 1: "... nor shall any state deny to any person with-
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
1Art. XIV, § 1: ".... nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law."
52 See Corfleld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1825). The case partially
examines those privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.
6 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Douglas v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). The theory of
the La Tourette case is that some residents might be non-citizens and
some citizens might be non-residents; therefore, a distinction between
residents and non-residents is not the same as the prohibited distinction
between citizens and non-citizens. In the Douglas case overcrowded
court dockets justified the discrimination against non-residents.
" In re Rodgers, 194 Pa. 161, 46 Atl. 668 (1899).
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only those privileges or immunities that belong to citizens
of the United States as distinguished from citizens of the
states ;5 and the privilege of attending a university as a
student comes not from federal sources but is given by the
state.5 6
A more successful approach for the frustrated non-resi-
dent Negro might be through the equal protection clause.
He would be especially concerned with the meaning of the
phrase "within the jurisdiction", for only those persons
within the jurisdiction of the state may invoke the equal
protection provision. Among the most liberal interpreta-
tions of that phrase is that of the Supreme Court in Ken-
tucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp.,5 7
where a state statute requiring full examination of non-
resident corporations as a condition precedent to suit in the
state was held invalid. Since the non-resident corpora-
tion's attempt to sue brought it within the jurisdiction of
the state, it would seem that the presence in North Carolina
of a non-resident Negro seeking admission to the university
law school would be sufficient to invoke the equal protection
clause. And perhaps the submission of an application to
the university authorities-a step similar to the filing of a
complaint in the court of another state-would bring the
applicant "within the jurisdiction". If the non-resident
applicant is within the jurisdiction of North Carolina, is he
not denied equal protection by a refusal to admit him to the
law school when non-resident white applicants, similarly
situated and similarly qualified, are occasionally admitted?
Proof of discrimination could be furnished by declarations
of university officials and by an enrollment record showing
systematic exclusion of non-resident Negroes.
Unlike the equal protection clause, due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment must be afforded "any person,"
although he may not be "within the jurisdiction." The non-
resident Negro applicant could contend that discrimination
in handling applications based solely on race (if he can
r Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
r, Hamilton v. Regents of U. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
262 U.S. 544 (1938).
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prove it) is per se unreasonable and arbitarary state action
and that such state action is a deprivation of "liberty" with-
out "due process of law."
Administrative and Legislative Approaches: In six main
proposals 58 the President's Committee on Civil Rights has
attacked the problem of segregation. For the first time in a
governmental document,59 segregation is frankly condemned
as a denial of equal educational opportunity, and it has been
suggested that this report reflects the majority sentiment
of the American people.60 Congress is the designated me-
dium through which the Committee would eliminate many
of the inequalities discovered, but whether or not Congress
may so act depends upon certain constitutional limitations.
One writer argues that the enabling clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment 61 may allow Congress to increase the
area of Civil Rights protection. 62 If one concedes that Con-
gress under this clause can act to remove inequalities, it
would nevertheless seem that many inequalities in educa-
tion, at least on the graduate level, can be eliminated by
judicial action alone through test suits brought by such
organizations as the NAACP. Of course, Congress, like
the courts, presumably has power to deal only with state
action; any legislative effort to cover private activity might
lead to unconstitutionality.
53 To Secure These Rights, Report of the President's Committee on
Civil Rights, (1947). The proposals are: (1) strengthening the right
to safety and security of the person, (2) strengthening the right to
citizenship and its privileges, (3) strengthening the right to equality
of opportunity, (4) strengthening the machinery for the protection of
civil rights, (5) strengthening the right to freedom of conscience and
expression, and (6) a long term campaign of public education to in-
form the people of the civil rights to which they are entitled and
which they owe one another.
69 See editorial comment, JOURNA. OF NEGRO EDUCATION, p. 2 (Winter,
1950).
0 Ibid.
eAmd. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce by
appropriate legislation the provisions of this article."
"Note, State Action and the Enabling 0lause ol the Fourteenth
Amendment, 44 ILL. L. REv. 199 (1949). Most anti-discriminatory legis-
lation has been introduced not under this clause but in terms of inter-
state commerce. Thus, the Fair Employment Practice Act was advanc-
ed to the 80th Congress under the commerce clause. Id. at 206.
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On the undergraduate and high school level, Congres-
sional efforts might accelerate the erasure of race distinc-
tions. The real question is whether (in the event that
equality in fact is found to exist between segregated schools)
Congress can intervene in favor of the Negro to supersede
the determination of the courts and enforce its own view
of equality. What weight will the courts have to give to a
Congressional determination, which derives its authority
from the enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
that educational facilities are unequal? The Amendment
seems designed to prevent state authorities from discrimi-
nating but not to allow federal authorities to impose upon
the states their own notions of what will create better
harmony between the races. In other words, the mandate
to Congress under the enabling clause is to strike at abuses
produced by state authorities rather than to supersede judi-
cial decisions allowing "separate but equal" facilities or to
utilize state agencies to foster federal goals. These observa-
tions must be absorbed, however, with the knowledge that
Congress does not seem presently inclined to deal with edu-
cational segregation.
The chief impact of educational segregation upon con-
gressional action may be through the argument that Con-
gress should not give federal aid to segregated schools.63
Perhaps, too, Congress may be influenced to incorporate into
its grants and government contracts with southern colleges
certain anti-discrimination provisions.6 4 Increased gov-
ernment grants during the present emergency might pro-
vide more leverage for such a measure; on the other hand,
times of crisis are seldom vehicles for purposive social re-
form. At all events, congressional action of significance,
though unlikely, is not definitely precluded.
Where Congress has not acted, three state legislatures
have. Prior to the Sweatt and McLaur'in decisions there
3 Chiefly on the ground that segregation is intrinsically uneconom-
ical and that segregated school systems should reduce expenses by
abolishing segregation before asking for federal funds.
An analogy is furnished by the Wash-Healey Act providing min-
imum wage standards for government contracts.
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was evidence of state opposition to segregation in higher
education: 63 New York, New Jersey and Massachusetts
have recently carried that sentiment into effect by estab-
lishing administrative agencies,66 modelled after those in
fair employment practices acts, to deal with the problems
of minority groups seeking admission to educational insti-
tutions. 67 Such legislation leads to several questions. Can
an unfair educational practice be defined? Massachusetts,
New Jersey and New York have found the task difficult. 8
And if the term can be defined, are private as well as tax
supported institutions to be included within its scope?",
Furthermore, these questions can not arise unless the state
constitution grants to the state legislature power to pass
such acts. Finally, the known political facts of life in
southern states lead to the belief that those states most
concerned with educational segregation will not accept with
alacrity fair educational practices statutes.70 The measures
taken to remove discrimination in northern schools, how-
ever, like the measures suggested in the Report of the
President's Committee, will undoubtedly influence any judi-
cial determination of the validity of segregation in graduate
education.
Individual University Action: It has been estimated that
as a result of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases over 1,000
0 Inequality of Opportunity in Higher Education: A Study of Minor-
ity Group and Related Barriers to College Admission. Report to the
Temporary Commission on the Need for a State University, Albany,
N. Y. (1948). College Admission Practices with Respect to Race, Reli-
gion and National Origin of Connecticut High School Graduates. Hart-
ford: Conn. State Interracial Commission (1939).
0 N. Y. EDuc. LAw, § 313 (Supp. 1950); N. J. STAT. ANN., § 18:25
(Supp. 1949); MAss. ANm. LAws, c. 1510, §§ 1-5 (1950).
17 Note, 64 HARv. L. REV. 307 (1950) furnishes a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the existing state statutes.
EsIbid.
"Ibid.
70 The noticeable ineffectiveness of state civil rights acts in some
states indicates that state legislation Is not a panacea. Statutes col
lected in Note, 39 CoL. L. REv. 986, 996 no. 66 (1939). Maslow, The Law
and Race Relations, 244 ANNALS 75, (March 1946) advances reasons
for their failure. The failure itself Implies that the phlegmatic atti.
tude of state legislature in the civil rights field will not greatly help
the Negro who seeks graduate education.
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Negro students in seventeen southern states are attending
institutions which formerly admitted only white students.71
Since these admissions are almost wholly on the graduate
level,72 the actions of individual universities in admitting
colored students is an important index in analyzing the
decline of discrimination in graduate education.
Not all southern university action was predicated upon
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. As early as
1908 little Berea College had admitted Negroes, in spite of
a Kentucky Statute prohibiting the maintenance of an insti-
tution in which persons of the white and colored races were
received together for instruction. Forced to discontinue
this practice when the Supreme Court upheld the statute7 3
the school is said to have welcomed the opportunity which
Sweatt and McLaurin gave it to return to its historic
policy.74
Other universities have followed the court's command by
letting down previous registration bars to deserving Negro
graduates. Unofficial figures place the largest number of
Negro graduate students on the University of Oklahoma
campus, where sixty students have enrolled.75 The Univer-
sity of Kentucky estimated fifteen Negro graduates under
its supervision; approximately the same number now attend
classes at the University of Arkansas. Texas University,
defendant in the Sweatt case, has accepted nineteen Negroes
for graduate study; Virginia.has admitted one colored law
student; Tennessee received three Negro graduates, as did
Delaware; and Missouri gave nine colored students a "cor-
dial" reception.76 In fact, only the universities of North
ADA World, p. 1 (Nov. 8, 1950).
1bid.
73 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
7' Southern Patriot, vol. 8, p. 9 (1950).
5 Ibid. This periodical contains recent information on the enroll-
ment of Negroes in all southern universities.
71 Ibid. et seq. Apparently William and Mary College in Virginia has
begun to admit Negroes.
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Carolina,77 South Carolina, Florida,78 Mississippi, Alabama,
and Georgia have refused to admit Negro students to the
graduate and professional schools. 79
The influx of colored graduate students into state uni-
versities formerly dedicated to segregation, if it continues,
may negative the importance of the equality in fact test.80
The foregoing statistics indicate that many of the southern
states have by their actions virtually settled a problem
which is still judicially present. Although the courts have
the final authority to say that a segregated state university
denies equality in fact, many universities have clearly antici-
pated such a decision. The six states retaining restricted
facilities must reckon with the climate of educational opin-
ion. On April 8, 1950, the first Southwide Conference on
Discrimination in Higher Education brought together 225
administrators and educators from 116 private and public
southern colleges and universities.8' Though no unanimous
conclusion was reached, all principal addresses given at the
conference decried the lack of adequate graduate facilities
for Negroes. In a message to the conference Albert Einstein
expressed the general attitude of most of the delegates:
"If an individual commits an injustice he is harass-
ed by his conscience. But nobody is apt to feel re-
sponsible for misdeeds of a community in particu-
lar, if they are supported by old traditions. Such
is the case with discrimination.1 82
But note the recent action of the Board of Trustees In admitting
a Negro to the medical school. Supra., note 43.
78 On August 1, 1950 the state Supreme Court of Florida validated
a plan whereby Negroes seeking courses not available at the segregated
Negro school could enroll at the University of Florida temporarily. See
Southern Patriot, supra., note 63.
"I ADA World, supra., note 71.
80 See Jenkins, Enrollment in Negro Graduate and Professional
Schools, a survey which has appeared annually in the Journal of Negro
Bducation since 1937. The latest report, showing a complete break-
down of enrollment In all Negro graduate schools, reached a grand
total of 1,362 colored advanced students. See JounsAL OF NEGRO EDUOA-
Tioiv, pp. 197-208 (Spring, 1950).
8 See Report on Conference on Discrimination in Higher Education,
Southern Conference Education Fund, (April 8, 1960).
Ibid., p. 8.
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However undeniable it is that some university officials either
completely favor segregation83 or support the regional school
plan,8 4 reports of the conference still indicate that most
administrators of segregated universities were willing even
before the Sweatt and McLauwin cases to search for some
solution.85 This sentiment, which grows stronger with each
case, may bring increasing pressure upon the administrators
of segregated schools.
Educational associations may also have some voice in
settling the discrimination issue.86 The American Council
on Education has adopted an affirmative programs7 includ-
ing the following basic points:
(1) Development of a program by the colleges themselves
that would eliminate such discrimination,
(2) Enactment of legislation wherever necessary.
1 Dr. J. Hillis Miller, President of the University of Florida, stated
that ". . . segregation in higher education at the present time is in the
best interest of the colored people." Tampa Bulletin (July 30, 1949).
Members of the University of North Carolina Board of Trustees ex-
pressed the conviction that the segregated Negro law school was quite
In the interest of the Negro students. See Durham Morning Herald,
p. 1, (Oct. 10, 1950).
U Under this plan a Board of Control for Regional Education is set
up. Its membership consists of the governors of the states in the plan
and three additional appointees of each governor. Executive offices are
in Atlanta, Ga., each staff contributing to the expenses required. Under
the staff's direction are several consultative commissions composed of
specialists for the specific area of activity concerned; these commis-
sions supply the needs of the region. All decisions are made by the
Board of Control and must be approved subsequently by the legislatures
of the states. See Report on Discrimination, supra., note 81, pp. 40-42.
ss Ibid.
8 It has been suggested that segregation is rapidly on the way out
and that consequently Negro institutions in general will be weakened
and many will die because states will put their money into non-segre-
gated institutions. This observation was prompted by the refusal of
the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools to allow
the Negro colleges of the region to become members. Richmond Times
Dispatch, p. 2, (Dec. 5, 1950). See Resolution V, p. 42, Proceedings of
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools (1949), for the formal
request made by the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools for
Negroes.
6 JOURNAL OF NEGRo EDucATIoN, p. 2 (Winter, 1950). The program
was the product of a conference on discrimination in which delegates
from twenty-four states participated.
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There is evidence that the pressure exerted by educational
organizations may become coercive if a member of the asso-
ciation refuses to abolish segregation, e.g. the proposal by
the American Association of Law Schools of a resolution
which requires the abolition of segregation by member
schools as a condition of membership.88  Presumably, this
requirement would extend to both private and public schools.
But these associations are at most confederations unable to
enforce effectively their own pronouncements; on the other
hand, whatever force they can muster is another thorn in
the side of segregated schools.
Attitudes of Southern University Professors and Stu-
dents: Unquestionably, the reaction of professors and stu-
dents to the conflict between equality in fact and segregation
will be reflected in future university action. A recent poll
of southern college and university professors, completed in
December of 1950, revealed that seven out of every ten
teachers who replied favored immediate admission of Ne-
groes to the graduate and professional schools of the South,
without segregation.89 Every professor polled90 received a
Is See Resolution on Discrimination, American Association of Law
Schools, (Dec. 28, 1950).
" JOURNAL or NEGRO EDUCATION, XIX, p. 118 (Winter, 1950). 70.5%
of the total replies favored no segregation. Only Alabama, Georgia, Mis-
sissippi, and South Carolina professors failed to vote overwhelmingly
for equality in fact as opposed to segregation.
10 Ballots were sent to approximately 15,000 teachers in 14 southern
institutions. Some 3,442 usable replies were received. Of these,
3134-91%-were from teachers in 130 "white" institutions and 288-
9%-were from teachers in 25 "Negro" institutions. The trend in
this poll approximated very closely the results of a similar poll of
"white" state university teachers in 1948. Although the ballots stated
that signatures were optional, 77% of the returns were signed, and
53% gave written reasons for their choices. A selected number of
these comments are reprinted in JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION, supra.,
note 89, pp. 122-133.
Any poll of this sort must be discounted to some degree. For one
thing, many violently anti-segregation professors might dislike all
alternatives and decide to throw away the ballot. Moreover, those who
did not reply may have been apathetic, but if pressed, would have chosen
one of the other three alternatives. Finally, in determining which re-
plies were "usable" a selectivity factor may have operated upon the
conductors of the poll.
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choice of four plans 9' providing for more equal educational
opportunities for Negroes in these fields. Although these
professors comprised the faculties of private schools, it
has been pointed out that a similar survey of state univer-
sity professors revealed approximately the same results.
92
Perhaps the inclination toward segregation diminishes in
the higher intellectual strata; if so, then those instructors
who will be most affected by the entrance of Negroes into
graduate schools are those most willing to accept them.
Observers have noted that white students have accepted
the admission of Negro students without rancor or vio-
lence. 3 At the University of Mississippi, however, the stu-
dent newspaper editor took the unprecedented liberty of
advocating the admission of Negro students. Brief resent-
ment flared up; a burning cross in front of his window
rewarded the editor's efforts.9 4 Notwithstanding this inci-
dent, a large scale student racial clash is not likely to occur
where Negroes are admitted to graduate schools in small
numbers. The more serious problems will arise when and
if colored students flock to the state universities en masse.
Yet if the students are willing to accept Negro classmates,
university policies may change accordingly.
11 Plan A-Open existing graduate and professional schools to Ne-
groes without segregation. 2,412 of the total votes cast favored this
plan. 68% of these teachers were from white Institutions; teachers
in Negro colleges voted 97 % for the plan.
Plan B-Open existing graduate schools with segregation. This
possibility received only 88, or 3 % of the total votes.
Plan C-Establish new graduate schools for Negroes. This plan
was the least favored of all. It received only 2 % of the votes.
Plan D-The Southern Governors' Plan to establish regional segre-
gated schools for Negroes; it received 842 votes-24.5 %.
0 JOURNAL OF NEGRO EDUCATION, supra., note 89, p. 118.
1 ADA World, supra., note 71.
0, Ibid. This incident was reported as a mild one. Delegates to the
Southern Law Review Conference held in Knoxville, Tenn., April 13,
1951, insisted nevertheless that the display was somewhat violent. It
must be recognized that many of the periodicals and newspapers cited
are Negro-owned or Negro-supported, and that the view taken may
place the colored student in a favorable position.
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IV. Extension of Equality in Fact to Private Institutions
Since the present clash between segregation and equality
in fact exists principally with regard to state-supported
universities, it may be said that McKissak v. Carmichael
for all practical purposes legally eliminates segregation in
state graduate schools. Accordingly, state universities may
expect a shift in student enrollment with colored registrants
seeking the traditionally more treasured degrees of the non-
segregated state university curriculum and with dissatisfied
white students seeking the more restrictive confines of the
private university.
Some private institutions may be licking their chops at
the thought that white students may be shunted to them
from public ones as a result of the admission of Negroes to
state schools. In a speech before the South Carolina Edu-
cation Association, Governor James Byrnes of South Caro-
lina expanded this idea when he asserted that public schools
may be abandoned in favor of private ones if segregation
in public schools is barred 5 While this view may be ex-
treme, the probability that private universities are to be-
come quite involved in the segregation question nevertheless
suggests itself.
A. State Action: Before it is concluded that the private
institution can refuse to admit Negro applicants, it would
be well to examine the meaning of "private" and ask whether
recent decisions have or have not expanded state action to
include the activity of universities usually thought of as
15 Columbia State, p. 1 (March 17, 1951). The governor's address
was prompted by a segregation suit which will be argued May 28, 1951
in the federal court at Charleston, S.C. His idea seemed to be that
education should be turned over to parochial schools. Undoubtedly,
this would create new problems as to separation of church and state.
Moreover, this state delegation of the sphere of education to parochial
schools might not escape the argument that those schools had them-
selves become public. An analogy is found in Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944), where South Carolina attempted to preserve the white
primary by turning its election machinery over to the Democratic
party; the court held that the party was to be considered a state In-
strumentality and its discrimination involved state action. See also
Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 287 (4th Cir., 1947).
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privately operated. The rule often stated is that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits only state action96 and that
the amendment is no limit whatsoever on the power of a
private institution to exclude members of a particular race
or religion.97 But the crucial question is: what institutions
are private? Recent decisions afford various approaches
to that question.
Discriminatory state action prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment may be of two types: (1) state originated dis-
crimination and (2) state enforcement of privately origi-
nated discrimination.
Discrimination originating with the state may be found
in the actions of state officials, in the exercise of state-con-
ferred power and in performance of a state function. It
would seem from the decisions that any discriminatory ac-
tion by any state official or by any instrumentality of the
state legislative, executive or judicial branches will consti-
tute state originated discrimination.9 8 But this type of
state action goes beyond the functioning of the three
branches of state government. A corporation's performance
of a state function in maintaining a "company town" may
also lead to discrimination originating with the state.99 As
a major premise, then, it may be noted that the doctrine of
discriminatory action originated by the state itself is an
expanding one.
Some of the recent cases involve an extension of state
action to include discrimination by private associations and
groups, the state taking no part in the original discrimina-
01 Civil Rights Cases, 199 U.S. 3 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948) at 13: ". . . The principle has become firmly embedded In our
constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to
be that of the states."
, Booker v. College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
13 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908).
W Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Where exercising state
conferred power, a union acting as bargaining agent for its members
may be guilty of state originated discrimination. See Steele v. Louis-
ville & Nashville RR., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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tion. Thus, in Rice v. Elmore"° a political party was held
to be no longer a private enterprise but to have become-
because of its importance to the electorate--"imbedded in
the election machinery of the country . . ."101 Although
this case has been said to stand for the proposition that a
state cannot idly allow a political party to discriminate,102
there is evidence that South Carolina had actually entered
into the original discrimination. 03 For this reason, a more
recent decision declaring that state judicial enforcement
of racial covenants is state action represents the broadest
application of the Fourteenth Amendment in this field. Al-
though the discrimination in Shelley v. Kraemer04 origi-
nated in private covenants, state enforcement of those cov-
enants is prohibited because:
"State action, as that phrase is understood for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to
exertion of state power in all forms. And when
the effect of that action is to deny rights subject to
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
the obligation of this court to enforce the consti-
tutional commands." 0 5
Carried to a theoretical extreme the doctrine of state
action might be limitless, so that every action within the
state would be state action. Hobbes maintained that the
1- 165 F.2d 287 (4th Cir., 1947).
20 Id. at 389: ". . . political parties have become in effect state in-
stitutions, governmental agencies through which sovereign power is
exercised by the people."
2 See Note, State Action Within the Meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution: The Stuyvesant Case, 23 TEM-
prLE L. Q. 209 (1949).
103 In 1944 the Supreme Court had held in Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, that the right to vote in a primary election held under state
law might not be denied on the ground of race or color. Immediately
following this decision, the then Governor of South Carolina convened
the state legislature and recommended that it repeal all laws with rela-
tion to primaries with the avowed purpose of preventing voting by
Negroes in the Democratic primaries of the state. Pursuant to this
recommendation, the primary laws of the state were repealed and the
Democratic primary was conducted thereafter under rules prescribed
by the Democratic party. See Rice v. Elmore, supra., note 11, p. 388.
2- 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
05Id. at 20.
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state existed to protect men from the miserable "state of
nature"'106 and that the state alone had power to act in all
matters of information and education. 107 Other totalitarian
thinkers have shared this political monism. They have
agreed with Hobbes that the only meaning in life of any
group is in terms of the state and that all groups in one
sense are creatures of the state. But despite the substitu-
tion of "Welfare" for "United" States, such a totalitarian
approach would probably not be accepted by the Supreme
Court. Moreover, for state action to have any meaning as
a constitutional concept, it must be an instrument of ex-
clusion as well as of inclusion; for if state action becomes
all-inclusive, then as a legal doctrine it becomes superfluous.
Thus, the real problem is to attempt a microscopic analysis
and to ask which characteristics of a private institution
might cause its discriminatory actions to be viewed either
as discrimination originating with the state or as private
discrimination enforced by the state.
Corporate Charters: To cite only one example Duke Uni-
versity, a privately-endowed institution, obtained its cor-
porate charter under the constitutionl ss and laws0 9 of North
Carolina. Since a corporate charter entitles a group to
special privileges-among them limited liability, perpetual
10 See Woodbridge, THE PmILOSOPHY OF HOBBES; SELECTIONS FROM
LEVATEN, (1903).
107 Id. at 333: "It is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what
opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and
consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be
trusted withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall
examine the doctrines of all books before they be published."
2 Art. VIII, § 1 of the Const. of North Carolina provides: "No
corporation shall be created nor shall its charter be extended, altered,
or amended by special act, except corporations for charitable, education-
al, penal, or reformatory purposes that are to be and remain under the
patronage and control of the State; but the General Assembly shall pro-
vide by general laws for the chartering and organization of all corpora-
tions and for amending, extending and forfeitures of all charters, except
those above permitted by special act. All such general laws and special
acts may be altered from time to time or repealed; and the General
Assembly may at any time by special act repeal the charter of any cor-
poration."
"I See N.C. G.S., § 55-2, relating to the formation and organization
of corporations.
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existence and the right to sue-the awarding of such privi-
leges is obviously state action. It is arguable, then, that
any discrimination practiced by the university is discrimi-
nation originating with the state by means of the grant of
the corporate charter. The piercing question, of course, is
whether the acts of the university in discriminating against
Negroes are acts properly classified as flowing from state
conferred power. If it can be shown that such university
action is actually an exercise of state conferred power, or
is the action of a state instrumentality, then the discrimina-
tion can be attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment.
An argument which implies that the activity of a corpo-
ration is state action must of necessity be a drastic one, if
the basis of such an argument is the issuance of a corporate
charter. Particularly is it extreme as applied to a private
university.. The privilege of limited liability is of less value
to universities than to profit-conscious corporations because
the university is not engaged in activities that are likely to
create tort liabilities. As to the privilege of perpetual exist-
ence, the same advantage might be obtained without incor-
poration by establishing a charitable trust to carry on uni-
versity activities.110 The awarding of these privileges to
educational institutions, therefore, should not be viewed
dogmatically as a grant of state power."'
Tax Exemptions and Subsidies: It has been suggested
that a privately endowed classical college has become almost
a government university by virtue of the tax and subsidy
status allowed these institutions by the federal and state
110 See 3 Scott, TRUSTS § 365 (1939). A charitable trust is recognized
as an exception to the rule against perpetuities. Would judicial con-
sideration of such a doctrine by a state court be Interpreted also as
state action, thus bringing the trust within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment limitations?
121 But under a contrary view does the state approve the discrimina-
tion by failing to withdraw the corporate charter? Could a Negro or
some other citizen bring quo warranto to compel the forfeiture of the
charter?
See Westin, Segregation and Discrimination in Higher Education,
10 LAwyms' GumD Rnv. 213 (1950). Footnote 61 lists illustrations of
government grants and tax exemptions.
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governments.11 2 If this premise is accepted, it is arguable
that discrimination by a subsidized private institution is,
in effect, the action of a state instrumentality performing
a state function. That private institutions receive tax
exemptions from the state is unquestionably true. North
Carolina, like most other states, exempts private universities
from state income tax,"8 real property tax" 4 and gift tax
on gifts made to educational organizations." 5 To determine
whether these exemptions are subsidies, however, the true
tax status of a privately endowed school must be examined.
The vaunted exemption from income tax is valueless, for few
colleges realize any net income; expenses often, if not
usually, exceed revenues." 6  In addition, since a gift tax is
normally paid by the donor and not by the donee, the gift
tax exemption is of no great advantage other than to en-
courage voluntary contributions made at the will of the
individual. Finally, there is no exemption from the state
sales tax." 7  Only the exemption from real property taxes
-3 N.C. G.S., §§ 105-138 (1950): "The following organization shall
be exempt from [income] taxation under this article: 3. Cemetery
corporations and corporations organized for religious, charitable, scien-
tific, or educational purposes, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual."
I5 N.C. G.S., §§ 105-296 (1950): "The following real property, and
no other, shall be exempted from taxation: (4) Buildings, with the
land actually occupied, wholly devoted to educational purposes, be-
longing to, actually and exclusively occupied and used for public libra-
ries, colleges, academies, industrial schools, seminaries, or any other
institution of learning, together with such additional adjacent land
owned by such libraries and educational institutions as may be reason-
ably necessary for the convenient use of such building, and also build-
ings thereon used as residences by the officers or instructors of such
educational institutions."
- N.C. G.S., §§ 105-188 (1950): "It is expressly provided, however,
that the tax levied in this article shall not apply to so much of said
property as shall so pass exclusively: (2) to or for the exclusive benefit
of charitable, education, or religious organizations located within this
State, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual."
Cf. N.C. G.S. § 105-147(9) (1950) (income tax deduction for char-
itable contribution).
110 This statement can be confirmed by any alumnus who has re-
ceived university pleas for gifts to meet additional expenses.
- N.C. G.S., §§ 105-164 to 105-187 (1950).
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lends strong support to the argument that the state thereby
"subsidizes" private institutions.
The usual understanding of subsidy is that the term refers
not to an exemption but to a specific grant from the gov-
ernment to aid the educational program.11 8 An excellent
example of this definition is the annual appropriation of
federal funds to endow and maintain state agricultural and
mechanical colleges.119 Federal funds are also made avail-
able to private universities, but the suggestion that those
schools are being subsidized is dispelled by the financial
statements of those institutions. The Duke University Fi-
nancial Report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950,
showed that no revenues of any sort were received from the
state and that total receipts from the federal government
amounted to only 8% (approximate) of total revenue.120
The United States Government specified each project to be
undertaken with the funds, which were distributed on either
31 In Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451
(D. Md. 1948), a privately owned nonprofit art school receiving an
annual subsidy from the city of Baltimore and the State of Maryland
rejected a Negro applicant in accordance with a policy of segregation.
He d; such discrimination is not state action becadse the institution
is private, not public. The decision has been criticized in 62 HARv. L.
Rnv. 126 (1948).
0' 7 U.S.CA., § 322. The statute sanctions the establishment of
separate but equal facilities. § 323 et seq.
220 Bulletin of Duke University, Financial Report, 1949-50, at 14:
Condensed Statement of Revenue and Expenditures:
Total Revenue $6,999,362.39
Schedule F-Government Gifts and Grants for Research:
United States Army-Contracts 125,234.66
U.S. Atomic Energy Comm.-Contracts - 20,146.75
United States Navy--Contracts 77,696.39
United States Public Health Service 228,557.96
United States Senate 1,000.00
United States Veterans Adm.-Contracts. 4,322.48 456,958.24
Schedule G-Government Grants for Training Programs:
Federal Security Agency-Contracts 41,375.00
United States Army 600.00
U. S. Atomic Energy Comm.-Contracts - 10,560.73
United States Public Health Service - 77,730.18 130,265.91
Total Government Revenue $ 587,224.15
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a cost-reimbursement' 2' or grant-in-aid 122 basis. It is diffi-
cult to visualize a non-profit government contract as a sub-
sidy supporting the private institution which receives it.
Since no financial aid is received from the state, only with
considerable imagination can it be said that the private
school is a state instrumentality performing a state func-
tion. Nor is this view supported by any aid which the uni-
versity might receive from the federal government. To
say that federal grants reduce private universities to gov-
ernment instrumentalities within the Fifth Amendment
and that state tax exemptions bring the endowed school
within the state action concept of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is to distort the wording of the Constitution. A tax
exemption is not yet grounds to find that discrimination by
a private school is state originated.
Charitable Immunity from Tort: The thorough examina-
tion in Shelley v. Kraemer of judicial enforcement proceed-
ings presents an additional possibility through which the
discrimination of private universities can be brought within
the scope of "state action." There is no legal doubt that
the action of state courts and judicial officers in their
The university, upon completion of the designated project, is
reimbursed by the government for the actual cost of performing the
contract. To the extent that private institutions are doing govern.
ment work on this basis, the institution is subsidizing the government.
Chief benefits to the private institution could only be in terms of spread-
ing overhead and avoiding cut-backs. Whether these advantages exist
will depend on what is considered "cost" under the contract. If there
is no appreciable reduction of overhead and other operating expenses
and if no other benefit is derived from the government contract, then
the subsidy argument falls.
'" A sum is granted to accelerate a university program already under
way. See 7 U.S.C.A., supra., note 119. Such funds are applied to the
development of the part of the program which the government desig-
nates.
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official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state.123
This issue is closed. But is a state court's refusal to con-
sider tort claims against charitable institutions, such as
private universities which refuse to admit Negroes, a state
enforcement of privately originating discrimination? If
the act of a state court, "in authoritatively construing and
enforcing its laws, is the act of the State,"'124 it is arguable
that the adherence of a state court to the common law doc-
trine of charitable immunity125 is a construction and en-
forcement of state law which, when applied to a discrimi-
nating university, involves state enforcement of private
discrimination. A close reading of the Shelley case, how-
ever, suggests a caveat. As the court pointed out there,
"The difference between judicial enforcement and non-en-
forcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference to
petitioners between being denied rights of property available
to other members of the community and being accorded
full enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing.' 120 The
analogy from this case to denial of a tort suit against a
private university which discriminates in its selection of
students is incomplete. In the latter situation the judicial
interpretation affects in no wise the barred student, but
'2 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313 (1880); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings Co. v. Hill,
281 U.S. 673 (1930); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Raymond v.
Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907); Home Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Prudential Insurance
Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922); American Railway Express Co. v.
Kentucky, 273 U.S. 269 (1927) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
2" Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1908). See also Amer-
ican Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), where enforce-
ment by state courts of the common-law policy of the state, which re-
sulted in the restraining of peaceful picketing, was held to be a state
action of the sort prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
ties of freedom of discussion. See also Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 315
U.S. 769 (1942).
' North Carolina recognizes charitable immunity. Green v. Biggs,
167 N.C. 417 (1914); Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N.C. 594 (1914). That this rep-
resents the majority view is stated in Herndon v. Massey, 217 N.C. 610,
613 (1940).
12 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra., note 104, p. 19.
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instead only precludes recognition of the rights of the tort
claimant. Consequently, despite the benefit to the univer-
sity from the precluding of expensive judgments, tort im-
munity seems insufficient to invoke the rationale of Shelley
v. Kraemer.
Public Utility: Application of the equality in fact theory
to private universities through an extended concept of state
originated discrimination raises one final possibility. It is
arguable that education is affected with a public interest
and so closely tied to the welfare of the state that any
educational institution within the state is, in effect, a pub-
lic utility.127 It is then suggested that because of the state's
power to regulate a public utility, the private university
is effectively reduced to a subsidiary of the state. Private
handling of a state function (education) is involved, and
any discrimination practiced by the private university be-
comes state originated.
The public utility argument would be especially strong in
the lower strata of education; some rudimentary education
would seem essential to the performance of the role of
citizenship, for, without it, one is not qualified to vote or
adequately to serve the country. On the other hand, ad-
vanced education, while desirable, is not as imperative either
from the point of view of the state or of the individual. And
so it would be difficult to apply the public utility notion to
a private university.
Perhaps the public utility concept would afford a state
legislature constitutional authority for passing a fair edu-
cational practices act. Such an act would merely enforce
the common law obligation of a public utility to give -non-
discriminatory service to all. But it is questionable that
the failure to pass such a statute can be state originated
2 Is there any fundamental distinction between public and private
agencies? See Barnett, What is State Action under the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution, 24 ORE. L.
REv. 227 (1945). In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), the court sug-
gested that many "private" businesses so substantially affect the com-
munity that the law considers them "public" for the purposes of state
regulation.
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discrimination. Under a view that state inaction can be
action, the judiciary would have to overturn any legislative
choice of a "hands-off" approach and undertake an extensive
program to remove discrimination by judicial decree. The
problem of judicial administration of such a court-created
fair educational practice act is another reason for favoring
a narrower view of state originated discrimination.
The approaches suggested in bringing discrimination by
private universities within the realm of state action are
both interesting and varied. State originated discrimina-
tion is not a static concept, nor is state enforcement of pri-
vate discrimination limited in its application. Although
judicial expansion of either view may change the law at
present, state action under the Fourteenth Amendment
apparently does not require private universities to change
their policies to meet the equality in fact test.
B. Anti-Trust Laws :128 The Fourteenth Amendment is not
the only medium through which equality in fact can be ex-
tended to private institutions. The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade or commerce among the states or foreign
nations.129  A statute prohibiting restraints of "trade or
commerce" does not at first suggest a protection of civil
liberties; yet it has been advanced that this implication is
derived from Magna Charta,180 and such a view has been
discussed in the courts.' 81 Cases arising under the act show
See Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 CHI. L.
REv. 171 (1951), for an exhaustive treatment of the entire subject.
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A., § 1 (1941).
210 See Holdsworth, Industrial Combinations and the Law in the
Eighteenth Century, 18 MiNN. L. Rev. 369 (1934).
m Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., ll U.S. 746 (1884) at
757: "The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades
and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been fol-
lowed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore, be
free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions. The right
to pursue them, without let or hindrance, except that which is applied
to all persons of the same age, sex and condition, is a distinguishing
privilege of all citizens of the United States, and an essential element
of that freedom which they claim as their birthright." Compare All-
geyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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a continual widening of the area embraced by the statutory
prohibition against restraint of trade 32 with the result that
the bounds within which the statute is to operate are set by
the standard of harm to the common good,13 3 as well as by
the economic freedom of the individual. By an even more
liberal construction of the anti-trust laws it has been argued
that discrimination stemming from private groups in con-
trol of higher educational facilities falls within the statu-
tory grasp of the Sherman Act. 34 If the argument is sound,
the board of trustees of a privately endowed college which
denies admission to Negroes may find itself to be a group
which has "conspired to restrain trade or commerce."
To invoke the anti-trust laws, however, a plaintiff must
find some right infringed which is protected by the act. A
private university which discriminates in its choice of stu-
dents cannot be attacked unless it has contracted, combined
or conspired "in restraint of trade or commerce." One may
concede that there is a right to an education, 85 and that
private universities are often guilty of discrimination, 36
but it nevertheless does not follow that the deprivation of
an educational right is a conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Unquestionably, there is sufficient group activity in the
action of a private university board of trustees to support
'3 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Diener
Cleaners, Inc. v. Vogue D.C. Co., 11 F.A.D. 479 (D.C., 1930).
1 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 183 (1911).
See Marcus, supra., note 128, at 205.
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 27. See also The
Selected Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 387 (1946), Annual Mes-
sage of the President to Congress, Jan. 11, 1944.
11 Mangum, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO, IV (1940); Forster,
A MEASURE OF FREEOM (1950); PREVENTION OF DIScRIINATION fn PRI-
VATE EDUCATONAL INsTrUTIONs, 47 COL. L. REV. 821 (1947).
It has been asserted that in the East a majority of application
blanks used by colleges continued to include discriminatory questions
which bore no relation to educational qualifications. See Anti-Defama-
tion League of B'nai B'rith, Anti-Semitism in the United States in




a finding of conspiracy, 18 7 but only with great legal imagi-
nation can a board's administrative policies be transformed
into illegal conspiracies in restraint of "trade."'8 8 Evidently,
discrimination in graduate education is not per se a conspir-
acy or combination in restraint of interstate commerce. The
language of the Sherman Act, broad though it is, is not at
present prone to such an interpretation.
Conclusion
No longer will the Constitution permit a state to educate
qualified Negroes in separate graduate and professional
schools. The Supreme Court has elevated the standard of
equality to a height that no segregated graduate school can
attain. Some states have recognized the sole solution and
have admitted Negro graduates to the state universities;
21" Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). An anti-trust case is
made out by proof of the fact of conspiracy; and If the necessary conse-
quences of a conspiracy is to produce a result which the anti-trust laws
are designed to prevent, the conspirators are charged with the result.
United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 (1913). Either the Board of
Trustees or the university corporation could probably be brought with-
in the act, if sufficient restraint of trade or conspiracy could be found.
"s Applying equality in fact to private institutions by means of the
anti-trust laws is not completely precluded by the foregoing analysis.
Notice has been taken that higher education is becoming Increasingly
important as the primary stepping stone to the making of a livelihood.
See Marcus, supra., note 128, at 208. This is especially true In the
professions. Graduation from an accredited law school Is often a
requisite for admission to a state bar association. For a typical re-
quirement see Rules and Regulations of the North Carolina State Bar,
January, 1943. The medical profession is even more discriminatory
in its educational requirements. See Group Practice Versus the Ameri-
can Medical Association, 18 Fortune, No. 5 (Nov., 1938). The Sherman
Act has already been construed to apply to combinations of professions
or services in restraint of trade. Rogers v. Poteet, 355 Mo. 986, 199
S.W. 2d 378 (1947); American League Baseball Club of Chicago v.
Chase, 86 N.Y. Misc. 441, 149 N.Y. Supp. 6 (1941). It Is feasible, there-
fore, to conclude that the exclusion of Negroes from a professional
association is a conspiracy in restraint of trade. See Marcus, i d4e.
Since private graduate and professional schools contribute greatly to
the flow of prospective professional practitioners from universities to
careers, it may be possible to trace the "pattern of discrimination"
from the private association to the private university and then to apply
the Sherman Act.
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others will undoubtedly follow. As discrimination in state
universities vanishes, private institutions will be drawn into
the conflict between the new standard of "equality in fact"
and the old conception of separation of the races. The com-
ing legal campaigns in the war against segregation will
determine whether the defenses available to "private" grad-
uate schools are less vulnerable than those of the state uni-
versities.
